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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the agency of objects within the context of contemporary 
art discourse by viewing them through the lens of fetishism. The fetish has been 
widely used to describe a material object that possesses some concentrated force 
or power beyond its materiality - a power that is somehow inordinate, misplaced or 
inflated (Graeber, 2005: 434). This power is mediated and maintained socially, 
dependent upon particular beliefs and activated the moment it is interacted with. 
In this sense, by viewing objects as agential, fetishism constitutes a social theory 
of objects, and furthermore a condition wherein objects are capable of becoming 
autonomous social entities in their own right. The research is positioned within the 
contextual field of socially engaged art practice, with particular emphasis to 
Relational Aesthetics by Nicolas Bourriaud (Bourriaud, 2002: 112), which was 
written in relation to the growing prevalence of socially engaged practice as he 
saw it emerging in the 1990s (Ibid). However, an optical contemplation of objects 
as an inherently social activity is negated from Bourriaud’s writing (Bishop, 2005: 
62). The research has found that fetishism provides a useful means with which to 
understand both the social and participatory implications of objects within the 
context of contemporary art. I have investigated these capacities using a practice-
led methodology, wherein  my art practice has developed alongside my 
engagement with the literature, which I have used in tandem in order to further my 
understanding of fetishism and its relationship to contemporary art discourse. I 
have subsequently produced three sculptures and one public intervention which 
have been photographically documented, as well as autoethnographic responses 
of my own mental process of creating them. The research has subsequently 
identified and explored three crucial topics on the fetishistic capacities of objects 
within this context; their death, their life and the illusion they create. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As an artist I work to investigate the power and agency that material things 
possess. I do so that I might utilise this agency within my artistic practice, as well 
as address materiality and its contention within art discourse. The publication of 
Lucy Lippard and John Chandler’s essay ‘The Dematerialization of Art’ sought to 
identify a condition whereby the conceptual content of a work was being seen to 
replace its material autonomy, rendering the art object ‘obsolete’ (Lillemose, 
2006). This established a curious position for material things and their immaterial 
antipodes – the mental and social forms that artworks produce, prompt or 
instigate. It is in these ways that I have become interested in exploring the 
imaginative and social implications of this immaterial form, and furthermore the 
means by which objects are capable of producing it. However, it is by viewing the 
agency of this immaterial form as a sacred power – and by exploring the 
potentials of this affinity - that my research interests have taken root. This has led 
me to compare the art object with the sacred object as I consider their shared 
function as material embodiments of immaterial forms - be that sacred, social or 
otherwise. These investigations are made with the intention of understanding not 
just the power of objects, but more so the means by which their power is born of 
an encounter with people – the sacred object presenting an agency which is 
maintained by both belief, and a certain set of theological doctrine. It is for these 
reasons that I am endeavouring to not only understand the agency of objects, but 
moreover the means by which this agency is informed by our relationship with 
them.  
For the purpose of understanding this relationship I have been led to study the 
phenomenon of Fetishism. Fetishism has been widely used across a variety of 
fields to describe the entanglement between people and objects, notably by Karl 
Marx in his theories surrounding commodity fetishism or by Sigmund Freud as a 
means of describing sexual fetishism (Apter, 1991) – the latter of which will 
probably be the most immediate definition of the term that comes to mind within 
the contemporary lexicon. The word derives from the Portuguese feitiço meaning 
‘something made’ or ‘artificial’ (Graeber, 2005: 434), and entered the English 
language due to its prevalence of use in the 17th Century by Portuguese merchants 
in African colonies, as a means of describing the charms, amulets or other items 
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associated with ritual and sorcery that they came into contact with (Ibid). The 
objects in question, to the colonists’ eyes, were irreconcilable with the Eurocentric 
value system to which they were accustomed, seeming to be somehow crude or 
lacking in monetary worth. Much less were the colonists able to understand the 
belief systems that attributed these ordinary objects with value, the word soon 
became synonymous with these specific items in order to describe a material 
object that possesses some concentrated force or power, a power that is 
somehow inordinate, misplaced or inflated.  
Subsequently, fetishism describes a process by which we submit to our own 
creations as if they were alien powers imposed upon us, or as David Graeber 
describes, falling down and worshipping that which we ourselves have made 
(Graeber, 2005. P.412). Beyond being perceived as mere curios or objects of 
desire, a fetish describes an object that is implicated with some sacred force or 
supernatural capacities. This power is one that is socially both mediated and 
maintained, dependent upon a particular set of beliefs and activated the moment it 
is interacted with. Fetishism then demonstrates the means by which this 
transaction is capable of giving life to objects. In this sense, by viewing objects as 
being anything other than static, fetishism constitutes a social theory of objects, 
and furthermore a condition wherein an object is capable of becoming an 
autonomous entity in its own right.  
As fetishism describes a relationship between people and objects that imbues 
objects with some form of power, it is useful to make these considerations in 
relation to art discourse – arguably a field that could be defined very much in 
terms of its study of objects and their encounter with people. The social function 
of art is one that has a rich field of critical enquiry, notably more recently with the 
publication of Nicolas Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics, which he describes as 
“Aesthetic theory consisting in judging artworks on the basis of the inter-human 
relations which they represent, produce or prompt” (Bourriaud, 2002: 112). The 
text addresses a model of art production where art’s social dimension was the 
central focus for critical enquiry - written in relation to the growing prevalence of 
socially engaged practice as he saw it emerging in the 1990s (Ibid). However, 
Claire Bishop criticises the absence of a perspective in which an optical 
contemplation of objects as an inherently social and participatory activity is 
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negated from Bourriaud’s writing, citing a preference for artworks that demand a 
more literal participation (Bishop, 2005: 62). It is for these purposes that fetishism 
will be useful as a means with which to understand both the social and 
participatory implications of objects within the context of contemporary art. 
It is for these purposes that this study will use fetishism and its associated 
discourse to create a lens through which the role of the object within 
contemporary art discourse – and furthermore its power - might be viewed. In so 
doing I will endeavour to analyse the social function of the fetish object, as I 
engage with source material that provides examples of its uses in the creation of 
sacred spaces and objects, as well as by studying examples of its uses within 
more ‘profane’ settings. These observations will support me in locating the agency 
that these objects possess, how that agency is generated and how it might be 
harnessed within my own artistic practice.  
 
Methodology 
The Artistic Turn, a Manifesto describes artistic research as being ‘Knowledge of 
the process of creativity, not its outcomes.’ (Coessens, Crispin and Douglas, 2009: 
14) Implicit in this statement is a shift in the purpose of artistic research, when 
compared with other disciplines, away from the outcome and towards the process 
that precedes it. This analogy is used to describe not only what one might 
consider academic research, but rather artistic practice as a whole, the authors 
considering the artistic process a research process in its own right, wherein 
consistent judgements and inferences are made as a means to better understand 
one’s artistic process. Within this inference, it is not so much the artwork but the 
process of creating it that constitutes a research activity. Furthermore, in relation 
to my subject matter, Graeber describes fetishism as being a “dimension of 
action” (Graeber, 2005: 425), which indicates that rather than simply indicating a 
means of categorising objects, fetishism should be thought of as an activity that 
one participates in. This action is one that is enacted not only by the creator of the 
fetish, but furthermore by those who interact with it as they are compelled to 
participate and subsequently implicate it with an inflated value.  
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It is with these considerations in mind, and with an emphasis on the processes of 
both art production and fetishism, that I have adopted a practice led research 
methodology, deeming it as an appropriate means by which the implications of 
fetishism and its uses might be better understood. In this way my artistic practice 
has developed alongside my engagement with the literature, which I have used in 
tandem in order to better understand the implications of fetishism on artistic 
practice. In so doing, the process of creating the artworks that I have produced 
has constituted a form of knowledge creation, insofar as they have bolstered my 
insight into fetishism and its implications, and in so doing provided further 
avenues for academic exploration. My process could thusly be described as an 
auto-ethnographic process - a research practice well suited to arts-based research 
though by no means limited to it - as allowing the researcher to consider 
themselves as a research subject in their own right (Adams and Holman Jones, 
2018: 141). Adopting this perspective has allowed me to distil and document my 
own shifting relationship with my practice – and furthermore with the subject 
matter of fetishism – as it develops. The artworks that I have created – and 
furthermore my own personal account of the intellectual process of producing 
them – then serves to both illustrate and demonstrate my findings, whilst also 
acting as research outcomes against which the literature might be better 
understood, and my concepts further developed.  
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Chapter 1 
THE DEATH OF OBJECTS 
“The animated object is a disquieting presence that captures our gaze, 
spellbinding us and plunging us deep in the enigma of things. It forces us into 
confronting the ultimate, inscrutable and utterly tangible event of us becoming, 
with death, objects ourselves.” (Marenko, 2009: 252) 
A materialistic worldview is dependent upon the diametric opposition between 
human subjects and material objects (Dant, 1996) - the material world presenting 
a point at which ‘I’ ends and ‘something else’ begins. It is precisely these 
distinctions which demands the need for fetishism as a field of categorisation in 
the first place, which somehow describes a perversion of these precisely set 
distinctions – the condition wherein pseudo-human relationships are established 
between humans and non-human objects (Ibid). But where does this boundary 
between human and object precisely sit, and could it potentially be a far more 
messy and non-distinct affair? As the quote above from Betti Marenko suggests, 
the point of death for the human subject does, to some extent, collapse these 
differences by constituting the moment at which the body is transformed into an 
object (2009). This observation is important, as in order to understand the 
processes by which fetishism is capable of animating seemingly lifeless objects, 
one must initially understand the antithesis of such a state of being - the inanimate 
state of being dead.  
This perspective of the ‘dead-ness’ of objects is nothing new. Traditionally, the 
interest in fetishism and its study stems not only from a desire to understand the 
power of objects, but moreover with a caveat of viewing that power as somehow 
being incorrectly attributed or misplaced (Graeber, D. 2005). From Marx’s 
commodity fetishism wherein commodity objects are seen to be concealing the 
truth of human labour and a resultant misunderstanding of value and its origins 
(Dant, 1996), to Freud’s study of sexual fetishism wherein the object performs the 
role of a sexual surrogate or a stand-in for reciprocating human sexual organs 
(Apter, E. 1991), there is a sense across the history of this term in which to identify 
a fetish is, as Tim Dant describes, “[…]to expose the inadequate beliefs of those 
who revere it for what they believe it is capable of” (1996, p.496). Fetishism then 
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does not describe a rational truth of objects, but rather a disordered way of 
thinking - one that disrupts the natural hierarchy of humans’ dominion over the 
material world. Fetishism in this sense, Dant goes onto say, describes “[…]a 
misunderstanding of the world in which properties are attributed to objects that 
can only correctly be attributed to humans.” (Ibid: 496). The fetish is then an object 
whose agential qualities are somehow inaccurately attributed or fictitious, with 
these distinctions being made under a rational understanding of the material or 
concrete qualities of the object. This perspective is one that privileges the agency 
of humans over the agency of things whilst seeing the object as something that is 
dead – or at the very least as something that is in-capable of life.  
It was by considering this perceived deadness of objects that I endeavoured to 
produce a sculpture explicitly exploring death as a thematic reference point, so as 
to cultivate a greater understanding as well as illustrate the themes that I will 
come to address. The sculpture’s title We Scorn What We Eat (Fig.1) is taken from 
a quote by Jean Baudrillard (Baudrillard and Gane, 1993: 138), which I will later 
discuss in greater detail (pp. 10). The piece takes as its thematic reference point 
images of death - with specific emphasis to carved tomb effigies, and is 
composed of a free-standing cardboard cut-out that depicts a computer-generated 
3D rendered image of a lying, shrouded figure – inviting an assumption that the 
figure is dead. The iconography to which the piece’s imagery is borrowed is that of 
transi tombs, a Christian tradition originating in the middle-ages wherein carved 
images of dead and decaying corpses were presented either as an adornment to a 
tomb or as stand-alone effigies, the figures often shrouded and having been 
subject to the ravages of decomposition (Cohen, 1973). The purpose of 
appropriating iconography of this nature was so as to generate an image that was 
unequivocally ‘death-like’, drawing upon the potency and symbolic value that such 
images possess, with particular emphasis on the insight this might my provide to 
the relationships between the in-animacy of objects as mirroring the in-animacy of 
the human cadaver.  
It will be by exploring the relevant literature in relation to this piece that this 
chapter will subsequently beg the question; to what extent does death – or rather 
an understanding of the deadness of things and the relationship this has with 
conceptions of our own mortality – influence our relationship with material  
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Fig. 1 – We Scorn What We Eat (2019) 
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objects? Furthermore, it will also seek to scrutinise the boundary between ‘dead 
things’ and ‘living things’ – and furthermore between objects and people - so as to 
better understand the point at which each is transformed into the other. It is for 
these reasons that death and its associated objects, customs and behaviours 
present a crucial opportunity to witness the tumultuous relationship between 
people and things in action, not only in part due to the perspective it provides to 
the perception of the ‘dead-ness’ of things, but also due to the capacity of death to 
shift and change the value of objects.  
 
1.1 - Inanimate Bodies 
“Anthropologist Franco La Cecla, an acute observer of the fluid narratives 
embodied in everyday objects, writes that the more objects proliferate, the more 
our culture pretends that they are dead, professing “a strange metaphysics of 
neutrality and of non efficacy of things that it calls ‘materialism” (Marenko, 2009: 
244) 
As the above quote from anthropologist Franco La Cecla as quoted by Betti 
Marenko is testament to, it seems also that a culture in which objects proliferate 
runs in tandem with a perspective of their ‘deadness’. This observation is of 
particular interest when one considers the proliferation of objects within the 
material economy of capitalism – a system that is governed by the pursuance of 
material goods – and also within the material economy of the art market. The text 
goes onto describe materialism as a fearful precaution in front of the dangers of a 
world in which objects may be “singular”, and thus animated (Ibid: 244), which 
infers that a materialistic worldview negates the autonomy of objects out of an 
anxiety of a world in which objects might exist independently of humans, and are 
thus ‘singular’ autonomous entities. This arguably illustrates that it is the 
materially concrete qualities of objects – and furthermore their in-animacy - that 
lubricates their exchange by providing fixed determinations of value which allude 
to their concrete qualities. This condition is one which places the object in a 
position of subjugation beneath the human. The ‘dead-ness’ of things, then, 
presents itself as a useful dividing line by which objects and people might be seen 
as distinctly separate or ontologically opposed – a perspective I will go onto 
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explain maintains an avoidance of our own eventual assimilation, in death, into the 
world of objects ourselves. 
The various human practices surrounding death conjure an array of contradictory 
insight into our relationships with the material world. Death is bound up with 
processes by which the value attributed to the material human body – and 
furthermore human possessions - can be seen to shift. The cadaver for example 
possesses a distinctly different value to that of a person and is somehow thought 
of as something that is distinctly separate to the person. For these reasons the 
dead body is often placed into a different symbolic order, to varying degrees and 
by various means. For example, historically the cadaver is seen as being 
something that is unclean or hazardous to the world of the living, with other 
residues of the deceased’s body such as bones, ashes, hair or possessions on the 
other hand entering into a different and often venerable status (Gibson, 2010). 
Margaret Gibson discusses these differing definitions by describing the cadaver 
as being categorised under the ‘abject’ order of things, and subsequently as being 
something that is somehow distant or separate from the individual. The abject, for 
Gibson, is categorised as something that is distinctly ‘not me’, alongside other 
products that are expelled from the body such as urine, menstrual blood and 
faeces (Gibson, 2010: 56). These substances are expelled, - and thus are seen as 
separate from ‘the person’ – so as to ensure the person’s continued survival. The 
corpse then, in this instance, becomes the final remainder to be extracted from the 
activity of living - the final and most abominable of wastes to be disposed. The 
cadaver then embodies the essential yet most uncomfortable truths of our 
eventual assimilation into the order of the abject at the point at which death 
prevails, as well as an illustration our body’s movement across the border from 
‘self’ towards ‘non-self’. As Gibson quotes Julia Kristeva in the same text, ‘It is no 
longer I who expel, ‘I’ is expelled.’ (Ibid: 57) These observations of the dead and 
their separation from the order of the living – but also from the order of the self – 
starts to establish a perspective with which one can understand the discontent 
with which the inanimate object is perceived; as an uncomfortable reminder of our 
own eventual assimilation into the world of objects. The person and the body are 
evidently then seen as distinctly separate things, the former of which is precious 
and the latter of which as waste to be disposed. 
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Jean Baudrillard expands upon these considerations in his text Symbolic 
Exchange & Death, in which he investigates death and its symbolic value. 
Baudrillard discusses what he terms ‘the extradition of the dead’ from the centre 
of public life, by revising Michel Foucault’s conception of ‘the extradition of mad 
men’, which provides useful insight into the societal implications of death and its 
various practices (Baudrillard and Gane, 1993: 147). Baudrillard posits that the 
dead are separated from the world of the living – and furthermore from the centre 
of our social worlds – in order to determine life’s value. For Baudrillard, value is 
determined by its relationship to its opposite, so through death’s exclusion life 
becomes a survival determined by death (Ibid: 148). For all intents and purposes, 
Baudrillard regards the conceptualisation of death as a man-made fabrication - a 
means of determining the symbolic value for a thing which does not exist, death 
merely constituting the absence of life. Death then serves as nothing more than a 
dividing line by which the symbolic value of one’s life might be extracted. 
Baudrillard makes these claims in relation to burial practices, wherein he states 
that graveyards - which at one time had existed at the centre of towns – were 
increasingly expelled to the peripheries, something he describes as being akin to a 
‘ghetto beyond the grave’ (Ibid: 127-128)Through these observations one can infer 
that death, rather than simply signifying the end of a determined lifespan, instead 
as providing meaning to the very notion of what it means to live.  
“We scorn what we eat, we can only eat what we despise, that is, death, the 
inanimate, the animal or the vegetable condemned to biological assimilation.” 
(Baudrillard, 1993: 138) 
As the above extract illustrates, which was written in relation to Baudrillard’s 
perspective on the transgressive act of cannibalism, our ‘scorning’ of that which 
we eat – that is death or the inanimate – infers not just scorn for the ‘dead’ world 
of objects, vegetables or animals, but also infers the collective position that 
somehow humans are ontologically opposed to inanimate things; a perspective 
that is explained through our desire to consume only that which exists in 
opposition to us. These concepts are further iterated by Gibson, who 
demonstrates the mechanisms by which theological doctrine – with specific 
emphasis to that of the Christian church – reconciles this opposition by entering 
death into the sacred order of redemption:  
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“Religions, in both belief and ritual, practice a moral economy of redemption or 
return of the negative (including the abject) into the positive, sacred order. Thus 
waste, the abject body, returns as sacred and redeemed in the Christian economy 
of resurrection and salvation.” (Gibson, 2010: 56)  
Transi tombs present an illustration of this return of the abject corpse into the 
sacred order of redemption and salvation that the Christian tradition connotes 
(Gibson, M. 2010. p.56), with their carved depictions of emaciated or decaying 
corpses serving the function of reminding the onlooker of death’s material realities 
and inevitability (Cohen, 1973). Arguably, then, it could be perceived that 
conceptions of redemption and the afterlife provide useful resolution to our scorn 
for death and in-animacy, as to does the transmutation of value that the cadaver 
becomes subject to under these conditions.  
Baudrillard takes these considerations further, determining that we live in a ‘culture 
of death’ (Ibid: 148) such is the extent to which human culture is permeated by our 
opposition to death. Baudrillard states that it is by the conceptualisation of death 
that it enters into the realms of symbolic exchange, rather than becoming 
‘absolute surplus value’ (Ibid: 152) – death constituting a determination of value 
for a thing that is absent and should consequently, then, be incapable of exchange. 
It is then through the exchange of death – facilitated by the dead’s extradition - 
that concepts of immortality and the afterlife start to emerge – such as in the 
Christian tradition as noted above - working in tandem as tools of power and 
control emboldening the power of the church, the state or capital who act as 
protectorates for the stake of the living. In essence, it is in these ways that death – 
through its conceptualisation – enters the symbolic order of value, and is thus 
capable of being exchanged, be that under the value of theological doctrine or 
otherwise.  
In the production of We Scorn What We Eat (Fig. 1), I possessed similar desires to 
those of the production of transi tombs, in that the piece was designed to remind 
the onlooker of death. However, it was with these considerations in mind that I 
endeavoured to present death as a man-made fabrication so I might subvert the 
notion of death’s potency. I did so in order to illustrate the falsehood of death as 
described by Baudrillard by quite literally presenting death as an illusion – one in 
which an artifice of three-dimensionality was somehow being forced upon the 
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onlooker. It was for these purposes that I also identified the cardboard cut-out as a 
method of production that is typically attributed to the creation of some form of 
artifice - such as shop window dressing or stage set design – an artifice that is 
further iterated in my decision to create the image as a computer generated 3D 
rendering. If one views the object as a piece of stage scenery, then one could also 
declare that its fourth wall seems to have been broken with its artifice being plainly 
declared. The two-dimensionality of the façade then denies the viewer an 
opportunity to come into closer contact with the object from alternative angles – a 
typical attribute of three-dimensional sculpture – which places the viewer at a 
purposeful distance. The viewer is then denied the opportunity to look behind the 
image, alluding to a sense that some truth of the object is somehow being 
withheld from the onlooker. In addition to the falsity of this illusion, there is a 
second falsity that is being presented to the viewer through the multiple levels of 
concealment that it demonstrates, a concealment on one hand through the 
object’s two-dimensionality, and on the second in that the figure is shrouded - 
denying the viewer the opportunity to see what lies underneath the cloth but 
nevertheless inviting an assumption that they are dead. The question posed here 
is whether or not the potency of such an object – and furthermore the potency of 
death - remains in-spite of such an illusion. There is too, in addition to this, a ‘dead-
ness’ here embodied due to the finality presented by such an illusion – a façade 
that is static, closed and seemingly un-agential.  
These considerations are important for the purpose of understanding the sacred 
means by which, not just corpses, but all inanimate things are capable of being 
ascribed with some sacred potency or value in much the same way – what Mircea 
Eliade describes as a hierophany or a material manifestation of the sacred (1959) 
– which will take us some way to understanding the agency that fetishes possess 
as a value which is socially mediated and prescribed. This is somewhat 
contradictorily reflected in We Scorn What we Eat (Fig. 1), wherein although I have 
created an image that is unequivocally dead, through its multiple levels of 
concealment and artifice the viewer is invited to project meaning onto it, whilst 
also being compelled to collectively imagine that which they are unable to see. 
Although dead, in this instance, it is also animated, alluding to the means by which 
through the impetus to fetishize, even dead things do not stay dead for long. In 
terms of the inanimate and material qualities of objects, I would infer that it is our 
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inability to bear witness to the ‘dead-ness’ of things – and the mirror of our own 
inevitable death that inanimate objects face towards us – that leads us to perceive 
them as both living and animated, and subsequently fetishize them.  
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Chapter 2 
“IT’S ALIVE!” 
The title of this chapter is taken from James Whale’s classic 1932 adaptation of 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (Frankenstein, 1932), and the quote continues “It’s 
moving, it’s alive! It’s alive! It’s alive! In the name of God, now I know what it feels 
like to be God!”, spoken by Dr Frankenstein having achieved success in his 
experiment to harness the natural forces of lightening, and re-animate the corpse 
of an exhumed convict. Frankenstein’s claims to have harnessed the life-creating 
power of God are easily understood when one considers the biblical creation of 
man as described in the book of Genesis of the Old Testament, in which it is 
stated that “[…] the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed 
into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." (Genesis 2:7) Of 
course, these examples provide insight into the potent agency, as well as the God-
like human desire, to hold such dominion over the material world that one is 
capable of reanimating the inanimate, be that the animation of Frankenstein’s 
monster or God’s transmuting of dust into living flesh.  
These allegorical examples are useful, as having previously considered the ‘dead-
ness’ of objects and their position of mirroring our own eventual assimilation into 
the order of things, I will next go on to consider what is arguably a result whilst 
also the antithesis of such a state of being – the capacity of fetishism to cause 
objects to appear as lifelike, ‘animated’ and seemingly autonomous entities in their 
own right. Of course, these animated or lifelike qualities do not arise from the 
rationally material qualities of objects – as has previously discussed in relation to 
their ‘dead-ness’ – but rather it arises in the eye of the beholder, so to speak. This 
is to infer that fetishism describes a point of confrontation between person and 
object, wherein the human subject is somehow compelled to project life onto 
otherwise inert and static things. Understanding this compulsion, as well as this 
point of confrontation, will form the basis of this chapter, which I will explore in 
relation to two additional artworks that I have produced as a part of these 
enquiries.  
The first work, titled Symbolic Retribution (Figs. 2, 3), takes as its thematic 
reference point the social phenomena of leaving flower memorials within public  
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Fig. 2 – Symbolic Retribution (2019) 
16 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 – Symbolic Retribution (2019) 
17 
 
spaces, as typically left following some tragic loss of life such as a murder, a road 
traffic collision, a terrorist incident or the premature death of a public figure. 
Symbolic Retribution (Figs. 2, 3) is an ongoing public action or performance 
wherein I myself have created and left flower memorials in public locations in and 
around the geographic locale of my home in Urmston, Greater Manchester – an 
area that I regard as being typically suburban and unremarkable – and is being 
documented photographically on 120mm film. The benefit an activity such as this 
has on my research is in order to better understand the means by which both 
meaning and agency – in this instance as ascribed to a material location – are 
socially prescribed and maintained. It is for these reasons also that public flower 
memorials more generally have presented themselves as a useful tool with which 
to describe the agency implicit in fetishism, through their capacity to utilise 
objects – be that flowers, candles or items associated with the deceased – to 
inflate the value of a space or even open it up as a sacred one. I subsequently 
wished to use the project as a means to better understand the mental or social 
implications of such monuments – as well as the compulsion to create - by 
placing them within my own lived environment.  
The second work, titled The Martyrdom of St Sebastian (Figs. 4, 6), is a sculpture 
depicting the commonly rendered Christian scene of the martyrdom of the 5th 
Century Christian Saint Sebastian. The sculpture  is composed of a reclaimed car 
bonnet penetrated by arrows made of brass and steel, designed to be leant 
against a plinth or pillar. St Sebastian’s martyrdom is a recurring trope across 
Renaissance Christian art – commonly depicting a similar composition of the 
semi-clothed saint bound to a tree with a number of arrows protruding from his 
body (Liepa, 2009), however the composition was also notably re-purposed for the 
iconic 1967 photograph of Mohammed Ali taken by Carl Fisher (Gotthardt, 
2018)(Fig. 5). The narrative of the scene is that Sebastian, himself a Roman 
nobleman, was discovered by Emperor Diocletian to be a Christian and sentenced 
to be tied to a stake and shot at by archers until he was dead - the 15th Century 
historian Jacobus de Voragine describing the gruesome scene as “[Sebastian] was 
as full of arrows as an urchin is full of pricks.” (Fordham University, 2000). 
However, the ‘martyrdom’ of this commonly depicted scene is a misnomer, as the 
story continues that Sebastian somehow survived the attack – an apparent 
miracle indicating the strength of his faith – only to later be re-discovered by  
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Fig. 4 – The Martyrdom of St Sebastian (2019) 
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Fig. 5 – Muhammad Ali as Saint Sebastian by Carl Fischer (Gotthardt, 2018) 
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Emperor Diocletian and beaten to death (Fordham University, 2000). Saint 
Sebastian has subsequently become an emblematic figure of persecution, but he 
is also a symbol of the miraculous ability to overcome death. The recognisability 
of this composition provided me with an opportunity to visually infer humanity in 
an otherwise inert and static object –the car bonnet – by inserting it into a context 
where it could be seen as recognisably human, afflicted and dying. The benefit this 
has to my research is in order to better understand and investigate the means by 
which objects become attributed with human agency, and thus are fetishized, 
merely by the act of representation. 
The observations that I will present within the literature, and also by analysing the 
literature in relation to my art practice, will illustrate the fragile boundaries at which 
distinctions between humans and objects can be seen to collapse into one 
another, at the moment at which the object crosses the border to become an 
animated entity. This chapter will subsequently discuss the uses and implications 
within the field of contemporary art that arise therefrom, as will be further 
demonstrated by my art practice.  
 
2.1 - Fetish Market 
In order to discuss the animation of objects and its relationship with fetishism, I 
will first explore a prevalent use of fetishism within the contemporary lexicon, 
being the fetishization of objects under capitalism as a means of explaining their 
commoditisation. Karl Marx’s discourse surrounding commodity fetishism 
describes the ontological status of commodities as objects from which their use-
value has been extracted and replaced by a different value, as he employed what 
to him were the primitive notions of the fetish object to describe the seemingly 
magical or enigmatic capacities such objects possess. Use-value pertains to the 
value of objects to fulfil human needs or utilitarian functions, however the value 
ascribed to commodities is described by Marx as abounding in “metaphysical 
subtleties and theological whimsies” (Marx and Cole, 1957: 44). This fetishistic 
value is one which is described as having absolutely no connection with their 
physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom (Ibid: 45), but 
rather arises from a form of magical thinking (Baudrillard and Levin, 1981: 88) – a  
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Fig. 6 – The Martyrdom of St Sebastian (2019) 
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perspective which elevates the object beyond use-value and towards a symbolic 
value which is socially prescribed and maintained. The fetishized commodity, then, 
could be seen to represent the schism between use-value and exchange value 
(Marenko, 2009), a condition that results in it appearing to the subject not as a 
product of human labour, but rather as an autonomous alien facticity over which 
the subject has no control (Silva, S. 2013). Walter Benjamin considered, under this 
condition, that the commodity “becomes a magical object, insofar as the labour 
stored up in it comes to seem supernatural and sacred at the very moment when it 
can no longer be recognized as labour.”(Benjamin and Tiedermann, 1999: 699). By 
way of an example, these distinctions are tackled by Baudrillard who provides 
insight from within his own contemporary commodity landscape of the television 
set, wherein the value ascribed to the product is not dictated by its capacity to 
fulfil its utilitarian functions (Baudrillard and Levin, 1981: ). The value it is ascribed 
with, Baudrillard states, acts as a social relation and social signification indicating 
status or affluence (Ibid).  
The result of a condition wherein commodities exist independently of the work of 
human hands and minds - and thus are returned to us as autonomous entities – 
was considered by Marx to result in the alienation of the individual. For Marx, this 
condition causes the individual to forget their authorship or agency within the 
world, with the fetishized commodity no longer being seen to be a work of human 
hands at all (Silva, S. 2013). What is here described is the moment at which 
commodities become animated, and are thus seeming to the individual as 
autonomous entities beyond the scope of human control. It is in this sense that 
the commoditised object – through its animation – almost becomes deified in 
nature, as it is elevated to a status that places it above humans at a distance that 
is somehow unattainable.  
 “Thus, the fetishization of the commodity is the fetishization of a product emptied 
of its labour and subjected to another type of labour, a labour of signification, that 
is, of coded abstraction” (Baudrillard and Levin, 1981: 93).  
Baudrillard elaborates upon Marx’s conceptions of the fetishized commodity in his 
essay Fetishism and Ideology: a Semiological Reduction, as quoted above. This 
assertion is one that places the commodity within a socially prescribed value 
system of signification, whilst also insinuating that the labour of producing 
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commodities lies not within its material production, but rather within its perception 
and reception as informed by the social field of the market. Perception and 
reception, then, become the labour of production, with Baudrillard going onto say 
that the fetishization of commodities does not indicate a sanctification of the 
object, but rather a sanctification of the system – that is the generalised system of 
exchange and value (Ibid: 97). The agency of the fetish is not located inside the 
object so to speak, but rather its power exists elsewhere within the social field that 
supports it, the object itself reduced to a social signifier. It is with these 
considerations in mind that one can then infer that, through perception, it is the 
point at which persons or people look upon commodities and interpret their 
symbolic value as informed by the wider social field, that they come into being and 
are thus ‘animated’. 
Such is the extent to which the animation of commodities hinges upon perception, 
that Taussig considers it is through the very act of looking upon commodities, and 
producing a copy of their appearance on the retina, that their ‘spectral’ quality is 
generated – what he refers to as tantamount to the generation of an ‘Optical 
Unconscious’ (Taussig, 1993: 20). This spectral quality of commodities, Taussig 
suggests, is channelled by the mimetic machinery of the advertising image and 
such images’ proliferation, imbuing the commodity with what he describes as an 
aura generating a quite secular sense of the marvellous (Ibid: 23). What is here 
being concealed within the commodity – it’s ‘aura’ – and channelled by the work of 
the advertising image are the socially constructed ascriptions of value, price and 
meaning. It is here demonstrated the extent to which the fetishism and animation 
of objects is so totally linked with their commoditisation.  
It was through these considerations of the sanctification and subsequent 
fetishization of commodities that I was led to utilise a car bonnet - a discarded 
fragment of a mass-produced consumer product – in my creation of the scene of 
St Sebastian’s Martyrdom. Of course, an identical logic could be applied to the car 
as to Baudrillard’s television set in their status as ‘social hieroglyphs’, and popular 
culture is saturated with references to the car’s position as the ultimately desirable 
commodity. Take for example, the dystopian novel Brave New World written by 
Aldous Huxley published in 1932, in which an industrialised and seemingly perfect 
society of the distant future revere Henry Ford as a deity due to his creation of the 
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modern industrialised production line producing his Model T Ford automobile 
(Huxley, 2007). A further example would also be Crash written by J G Ballard, in 
which the commodity fetishism one might expect for cars has seemingly been 
replaced by an un-adulterated sexual fetishism, not for the car but for the 
experience of a violent car crash as some sexually potent and gratifying force 
(Ballard, 1995).  
“Every object is susceptible to investments (and divestments) of meaning, of 
acquiring (and losing) a specific aura, of becoming encrusted with (or stripped off 
) affects, of enriching (or reducing) our emotional world. This has to do not simply 
with their variable biographies but, even more so, with the ways in which they 
become our own extensions, in a process that turns stuff into a prosthetic 
arrangement without which we would not even begin to be who we are.”(Marenko, 
2009: 240-241) 
Marenko’s description of a ‘prosthetic arrangement’ goes some way to quantifying 
the extent of our entanglement with objects as quite literal material extensions of 
the self, such is the extent to which they are elevated by their fetishization. 
Margaret Gibson reiterates this entanglement, by observing that such is the extent 
to which concepts of property, ownership and the pursuance of material goods is 
fettered to the sense of individual that even after death objects can still be thought 
of or seen to be in possession of the original owner, even once they are owned by 
other people (2010: 55). I would even speculate that this demonstrates a process 
by which something of the soul of the deceased is perceived, in death, to have 
migrated to reside within the object, such is the extent to which our possessions 
are integral to our formulation of our sense of self.  
“The subject is no longer eliminated in the exchange, it speculates. The subject, 
not the savage, is enmeshed in fetishism; through the investment [faire-valoir] of 
its body, it is the subject that is fetishized by the law of value.” (Baudrillard & Gane, 
1993: 107)  
Baudrillard provides some insight into this relationship, as he describes the means 
by which individuals themselves become fetishized through a process he 
describes as adornment (Ibid). In the context of this text he refers to the use of 
make-up, jewellery and clothing and their ability to produce a particularly 
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‘unnatural’ form of desire that is wholly invested in symbolic value. In this sense, it 
is through adornment that we as individuals become further enmeshed with our 
material things, as we use them to decorate and thus commoditise our very 
bodies. By this distinction, the dividing line between our bodies and our things 
begins to blur, as both become exchangeable commodities to some degree. These 
considerations illustrate the means by which our possessions become not only 
fetishes embodying the system of exchange, but also fetishized embodiments of 
their owners. These concepts then iterate not just the fetishization of commodities 
as ascriptions of value determining their price, but moreover their capacity to act 
as fetishized embodiments encompassing the very being of their owners. Of 
course, it is not merely with fashion items that we decorate our bodies and thusly 
fetishize them, as the same logic could also be applied to a number of goods. 
These considerations demonstrate a further intention of mine to employ a car in 
my scene depicting St Sebastian’s Martyrdom, due in part to their position as 
embodying a particularly unnatural form of desire that is wholly invested in 
symbolic value, but also due to their efficacy as material extensions of the body 
within the contemporary landscape. The scene evokes an image of violence and 
affliction, but one in which it is the commodity product and not the human subject 
that is being presented as the afflicted party. What this connotes is our 
compulsion, through fetishism, to perceive these objects as somehow 
independent, autonomous, pseudo-human entities capable of the same calibre of 
recognition as that of their human counterparts, due to their status as being in one 
instance beyond ourselves, whilst on the other as extensions of ourselves. By 
visually humanising the car bonnet then in such a way, and ultimately by 
presenting it as experiencing the very human experiences of pain, injury and death, 
I wished to solidify the notion that this static object was somehow capable of 
these uniquely human experiences.   
 
2.2 - Animation 
“What if all the objects that surround us were to possess intelligence, a memory, 
maybe even a conscious will? What if they were able to affect us, to interact with 
us? What if they had agency?” (Marenko, 2009: 243)  
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Speaking then of the ‘life’ of objects - or the illusion thereof - Marenko considers 
the animation of objects in her essay Object-relics and their effects : For a neo-
animist paradigm, in which she advocates for a re-evaluation of the relationship 
between people and things through the lens of Animism, describing its potential to 
provide insight into the complex, relational and negotiated engagement between 
us and the material world (2009: 249). Marenko’s observations on the viewing of 
our engagement of objects through the lens of animism will also provide useful 
insight into objects’ fetishistic quality. Marenko describes animism as constituting 
one of the oldest and most widespread explanations for how the world works, 
hinging upon a belief that objects – as well as plants, animals or other ‘non-
human’ entities – possess an anima – an anima describing a life or a soul (Ibid. p. 
243). Marenko takes these considerations further, using animation as a means of 
describing a universal human impetus to perceive life within inanimate objects – 
due in part to the symbolic and affective investments that objects are charged 
with (Ibid: 239). It is these symbolic and affective investments that defines our 
relationship with objects, with Marenko describing this relationship as “[…] a messy 
and unpredictable one, electrified by emotional investments, often anxietyridden, 
never innocent or neutral, and always implicated in powerful identity-forming 
practices.” (Ibid: 239) 
To these ends, it is in studying the ontology of relics that Marenko endeavours to 
understand our relationship with objects through a ‘neo-animist’ lens, citing the 
relic as a useful tool with which this animist agency might be demonstrated. 
Marenko does so by not only investigating relics within the Christian tradition – 
describing the veneration of the bodily remains or personal effects of saints - but 
also provides further examples in: celebrity memorabilia, pieces of the Berlin Wall, 
a donor’s eggs or the wreckage of the World Trade Centre. Objects such as these, 
Marenko explains, present a messy ontological status due to their distinctly 
‘animated’ nature, be that through a perception of the contents of their history or 
some other perception that they should somehow be set apart from other ‘non-
living’ objects. Marenko considers this to demonstrate that these objects possess 
an excess of meaning or a surplus of significance, which is to infer that the value 
attributed to them has somehow been inflated, at the very least beyond their 
concrete or material qualities. One could then connote that this excess of 
signification – driven often by these objects’ historic or symbolic value – is stored 
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up within the object and provides it with its ‘anima’. Marenko describes this as 
tantamount to a dissolution of the symbolic function, as the animated object 
straddles the boundary between presence and absence – the presence of the 
material object and the absence of the historical event or sacred power that it 
alludes to. I would then suggest that the animated object demonstrates a 
convergence of the material and the immaterial, the former referring to the 
concrete qualities of the object and the latter referring to its meaning as mediated 
within the social field.  
Marenko’s observations demonstrate that there are different sorts of objects and 
spaces that elicit different sorts of responses, I would state dependent upon the 
varying symbolic investments that they are charged with. For example, Marenko 
discusses the use of scrap metal from the remains of the World Trade Centre as 
being melted down and implemented in the creation of a naval ship, and the 
various implications of value and emotion that this act elicited. From my own 
immediate geographic and social context also, I would provide an example in the 
large flower memorial that took root in St Anne’s Square in Manchester following 
the 2017 terrorist attack at the MEN Arena. The spontaneous memorial became 
emblematic of the city’s collective mourning, and such care and due diligence was 
employed once the time came for the site to be dismantled that it would seem that 
these objects had become too precious to simply be landfilled. Football shirts 
were given to charities to be re-used and any salvageable flowers were preserved, 
pressed and presented in a book to the families of the victims (BBC News, 2017). 
In addition to this, much of the remaining ephemera – presumably including cards, 
balloons, letters and soft toys to name a few – have now been archived by the 
Manchester Art Gallery, in collaboration with the University of Mancheste in a 
project titled the Manchester Together Archive (Perraudin, 2018) (Fig. 7). The 
curious thing that this demonstrates is the means by which these objects have, in 
the wake of tragedy, somehow been separated off from ‘ordinary’ objects and now 
possess a value which is somehow inflated due to the weight of their history, and 
the tragedy they have seemingly witnessed or embody. There is a sense then in 
this act of sanctifying such objects in – and through a refusal to simply cast them 
aside as landfill waste - that they are perceived as possessing an inflated value.  
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Fig. 7 – Memorial at St Anne’s Square (the Manchester Together Archive, 2017) 
These considerations played heavily in my own intention to act out similar public 
rituals in my ongoing action Symbolic Retribution (Figs. 2, 3), and this enabled me 
to garner a greater understanding of the investments of value, meaning and 
sacredness such public memorials both create and display. There was, in the first 
instance, a sense that I was somehow doing something wrong by bastardising 
such memorials from the source of their intended purpose, the memorials I was 
creating baring no affinity to some historic personal tragedy. To consider this in 
tandem with Marenko’s understanding of object relics straddling the boundary 
between presence and absence, the absence to which the memorials I have 
created allude is a totally absent absence so to speak – a memorial with no 
history to speak of. The question I considered here was whether the potency of 
such a symbol – an easily understood symbol within my own social context of the 
discarded bunch of flowers tied around a lamp-post – would remain in spite of this 
absence of history. A benefit of placing these memorials within my own 
geographic locale was that I was able, in part, to witness the shifting nature of 
these sites I had created, and furthermore infer their symbolic presence within the 
public spaces they occupied. More often than not I found upon returning to the 
sites, or walking by them on my daily commute, that the flowers were left un-
disrupted until they fully decomposed. What I could infer this demonstrates is that 
at the very least these sites were treated with a similar level of respect and 
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sacredness to that of their ‘real’ counterparts, and that their symbolic value was no 
less potent. There was one instance in which the site was disrupted with the 
flowers being removed no more than a week following the action – one can 
speculate by street cleaners although this is only an assumption - which in itself 
then leads one to consider the social implications of removing such sites, the 
longevity they deserve and the moment they are stripped of their sacrality and 
transmuted into landfill waste, an act which is arguably tantamount to the 
disruption of a graveside.  
Gibson’s aforementioned text Death and the Transformation of Objects (Gibson, 
2010) is useful for understanding our relationship with such objects or sites, the 
text taking the form of an ethnographic study investigating the transformation of 
value attributed to objects in the event of a death. Her research, which was 
conducted using interviews, found a list of objects falling into this category to 
include, though not limited to; hair, baby teeth, handwritten notes, clothing, ashes, 
a pipe, a hand-made clock, post-mortem photographs, partially destroyed objects 
from a motor-bike crash, medals and badges (Ibid: 103). What is here being 
demonstrated is the identity-forming nature of our relationship with objects - as 
described by Marenko – to such an extent that in the event of death there still 
seems to be the appearance of the deceased within them – a condition Gibson 
describes as making it difficult for the research participants to discard these 
objects, inferring the value and attachment ascribed to them. It could be viewed 
that the soul, or ‘anima’, that animates these particular objects is the contents of 
their histories. 
Michael Taussig rigorously addresses the agency of objects in his text Mimesis 
and Alterity, which provides some further insight into the means by which objects 
become animated by the contents of their histories as well as imbued with the 
agency of the individuals they have come into contact with. Taussig discusses the 
logic of sympathetic magic and its practices as theorized by James George Frazer 
at the end of the 19th century, in relation to the belief systems of indigenous 
groups of South America (Taussig, 1993). To simply explain, sympathetic magic 
pertains to a belief in an ideal connection - along a chain of ‘sympathies’ – as 
being understood as a real one (Ibid p. 49). These belief systems purport an 
assumption that in order to produce magical effects upon a human subject, one 
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only needs to act anywhere along this chain of sympathies that connects them. 
For Frazer, this magic and its efficacy functions on 2 levels of both copy and 
contact, the former of which I will later discuss (pp. 39-41). Contact, in these 
circumstances, refers to a belief that material objects associated with an 
individual are perceived to maintain a connection with them after that physical 
connection has been severed. Taussig goes onto explain how such items - 
including clothing, hair, nails, semen and even footprints - could be utilised and 
magically acted upon in order to effect the individual they are associated with 
(Taussig, 1993: 53). 
These practices demonstrate a belief that objects take on a residual character of 
the individual they have come into contact with, and can subsequently be 
magically acted upon in order to bring the magician into enough contact with the 
subject so as to cause them affect, be that for malevolent or medicinal aims. Of 
course, these practices are not limited to the beliefs held within the sociological 
context that Taussig describes, with the agency of contact also evident in more 
contemporary mourning rituals wherein there is a persistent belief that by coming 
into contact with the belongings or sites associated with the deceased that we are 
brought into direct communion with them – for example by maintaining an empty 
bedroom or in memorializing the site of a fatal car crash. These examples 
demonstrate the prevalent belief  that, through contact, physical objects are 
capable of adopting or embodying something of the character of the individual, 
and furthermore the contents of the individual’s histories. It is with these 
considerations that one can infer that the memorialised sites of tragic death 
provide an opportunity for those in mourning to establish contact with the dead, 
which they seek by perceiving the site of death as somehow still maintaining a 
connection with the deceased. It is in these ways that, counterintuitively, the sites 
become animated and thus fetishized as a lasting material embodiment of the 
deceased. 
It is also then important to understand that the objects associated with this ritual 
– flowers, stuffed animals and other ephemera – are not solely fetishized per say, 
but are rather indexical in the sense that they re-contextualise the surrounding 
space and shift its meaning. The symbolic value of the flowers possess a specific  
value within the specific social context in which they are situated, which 
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furthermore reiterates the premise that meaning and value are socially prescribed. 
The activity of creating these memorials then acts as a form of public 
communication designed to designate the space as a sacred one, whilst imploring 
the public to recognise the history that the site has witnessed and thus shift its 
meaning. Thomas explores these points, as she considers that there is a distinct 
difference between the intention of these public memorials to that of the private 
space of a graveside, as she considers that these memorials demonstrate 
intentions that are inherently socially or even politically motivated. This, she states, 
is due often to the tragic events that have led to the death of the loved one, so the 
spontaneous shrine could subsequently be seen as an attempt to effect social 
change – citing violent crime or dangerous driving as some notable examples. It 
could subsequently then also be understood that the spontaneous shrine does not 
so much exist solely for the benefit of victims and their loved ones, but is rather 
designed to affect the public. What is here described is a process whereby, 
through perception and mediated by social interaction, the space becomes 
animated. Not only does the public project meaning onto the space by interacting 
with it, but in so doing they are also allowing themselves to be affected by what 
they have themselves collectively generated as they are compelled to consider 
death and the tragic circumstances that have led to it.  
Marenko discusses this dynamic in relation to Christian relics, wherein she 
describes that any potency in the literal healing capacities of the bones of saints is 
not negated by the objects literal ‘dead-ness’, as its potency exists as a social 
relation informed by systems of belief, tradition, and theological doctrine (2009: 
241). The efficacy of their healing properties lies not within the object, but outside 
of it – be that through the social interactions it engenders as informed by tradition 
and ritual or in the perception that the divine is somehow channelled through 
them. What is here described is the means by which the animation of objects, and 
their subsequent fetishization, is generated as an inherently social relation. In this 
context Baudrillard’s description is useful, as he describes fetishism not as a 
sanctification of the object but rather as a sanctification of the system (1981: 92), 
be that the systems of religion, capitalism or wider social contracts. The meaning 
of objects then, and subsequently their capacity for agency and animation, exists 
as a social relation depending upon the specific social context in which it sits. 
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2.3 - Ritual Functions 
Bringing these considerations back into the realms of contemporary art discourse, 
I will next consider art objects in relation to their position within the specific social 
context of art institutions. As was addressed in the previous section, fetishism 
describes a process that is based in the interaction between people and objects, 
and furthermore the means by which, through some sort of ritualization, objects 
are imbued with agency. It is for these purposes that I will analyse the ritual 
function of art objects within the art institutions’ physical environments (the 
gallery, the museum etc.), and furthermore the specific set of social rituals that the 
art institution engenders, so as to locate the fetishistic character implicit in the 
relationship this establishes between people and objects. 
Dorothea Von Hantelmann provides a useful perspective on the role of art objects 
and arts institutions within society in her text What is the new ritual space for the 
21st century? (Von Hantelmann: 2018), which was published in conjunction with a 
Prelude to the Shed –The Shed being a multi-purpose and multi-disciplinary 
creative arts venue located in Manhattan, New York (The Shed). This text is of 
profound benefit for this study due to the means by which it describes the art 
institution as a ritual environment.  
Von Hantelmann considers that the historic purpose of ritual is a gathering in 
which members of a society communicate, enact, and maintain their view of 
themselves and the world in which they live (Von Hantelmann: 2018). It is in this 
sense that the ritual function serves to affirm the core values of a society, and 
through the de-individuation that collective gatherings produce, solidify these 
values within the ritual participants. It is for these reasons that historically 
speaking, ritual was the domain for the creation of new laws or the formation of 
new social contracts (Ibid).  
However it is the central position of the art object as a mediator of the ritual of the 
art institution that is particularly insightful, as Von Hantelmann asserts that art 
institutions are the essential ritual place for contemporary societies in which 
values ascribed to a wholly materialistic worldview are affirmed – defining our 
contemporary western worldview as being determined by the proliferation of 
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objects as both identity forming, but also as the basis for our material economy 
(Ibid). It comes as no surprise then that the art institution - a collective activity 
focussed around an engagement with objects – would be identifiable as a space 
in which our societies’ core values are demonstrated, with objects described by 
Von Hantelmann as the pivotal entity of this new ritual (Ibid). 
 “Every era builds its temples. Art institutions are the gathering temples of modern 
Western industrialized liberalism, which explains their peculiar character as a 
ritual: if every ritual is an immersive experience, this ritual immerses its 
participants in modalities of distance and detachment.” (Ibid, 2018) 
This point is further iterated, as Von Hantelmann characterises the ritual of the art 
institution as being directly linked to liberal concerns of the individual, the market, 
progress and pluralism (Ibid). Defying a historical use of rituals to conjure a sense 
of being a de-individualised member of a wider group, this contemporary ritual is 
defined in terms of the alienated position in which it places the participant. The 
liberal concern for individual autonomy is here demonstrated in a condition 
whereby rather than encouraging a collectivised togetherness, what instead the art 
institution generates is collectivised individuation – a dynamic wherein the 
participant is alienated from others and placed into direct communion with 
objects.  
“Durkheim's model of ritual emphasizes the misattribution of this subjective state 
to whatever salient and tangible source is available to a participant's senses. Thus, 
a totem becomes imbued with mana, the abstract power of society becomes 
objectified, and God is created.” (Marshal, 2002: 366)  
There is a sense, then, that the performance of rituals acts as a means of 
cementing belief, be that a belief in the abstract power of gods, supernatural 
forces or society. Douglas Marshal expands upon the points made by Von 
Hantelmann whilst revising the work of Emile Durkheim in suggesting that it is 
through the enactment of ritual – and through the collective de-individuation that it 
generates – that the effects of ritual become attached to the participants 
knowledge structures of the focal entity, thus cementing their power. This provides 
useful insight into the position of the art object at the centre of the ritual here 
described – and furthermore the primacy of the object at the centre of this ritual – 
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as a means by which the object is imbued mana1 at the moment it is worked upon 
by human minds, as has previously been described as an essential characteristic 
of fetishism. It is in so doing that the object becomes powerful, agential and 
animated through the collective generation of meaning that the art ritual demands. 
Of course, an additional consideration here made by Marshal is the basis of ritual 
behaviour in historical custom and a continuation of the same sets of beliefs and 
behaviours. It is consequently through the power these rituals connote due to their 
historical trajectory also that embolden and cement the belief that is desired.  
These considerations are evident in each of the artworks that I have created as a 
part of this research that are designed to sit within a gallery space, wherein the 
collective generation of meaning has been employed in order to give an apparent 
‘life’ to the object. I achieved this by making particular considerations to the spatial 
environments of gallery spaces, and furthermore by utilising the specific 
behaviours accustomed to these settings. Take for example my aforementioned 
piece We Scorn What We Eat (Fig.1) as previously discussed (pp. 6-13), wherein 
levels of concealment are utilised in order to invite the onlooker to imagine that 
which they are unable to see. To these ends I made considerations to the specific 
ways in which people encounter sculptural objects in the gallery setting, such as 
the position at which one would stands in order to view the work and the differing 
ways in which three-dimensional and two-dimensional objects are interacted with. 
The purpose then of presenting a two-dimensional object as masquerading as a 
three-dimensional one was in order to somehow frustrate these behaviours, whilst 
also alluding to the creation of an imagined three-dimensionality that is 
collectively rendered in the minds of the public.  
These considerations can also be made in relation to the scene depicting the 
Martyrdom of St Sebastian (Figs. 4, 6), wherein it is hoped that by presenting an 
otherwise inert and static consumer product as an afflicted and dying man that it 
will subsequently be perceived as such, and thusly imbued with the agency of not 
only humanity but also the symbolic values attributed to affliction and death. What 
this demonstrates is the importance of ritual – and moreover the specific set of 
rituals at the centre of art institutions – in providing life to the object. A life that 
 
1 The concept of mana was theorized notably by Marcel Mauss - in his studies of the uses of the 
term as it originates in Polynesian culture - to describe some magical power or quality as ascribed 
to an object or person (1972: 108). 
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arguably imbues these objects with an inflated status that on the one hand both 
facilitates their exchange as capital, whilst on the other causing them to appear as 
animated entities.  
The social rituals that art engenders were notably addressed by Bourriaud in his 
canonical text Relational Aesthetics, which advocates for an aesthetic theory 
which judges artworks based upon the social relations that they produce (2002). 
These considerations are made by Bourriaud in relation to the work of artists 
within the context of an emergence of socially engaged art practices as he 
observed in the 1990s. Examples include Rirkrit Tiravanija, who opened up the 
gallery space as an area of sociability and leisure in his series of Untitled(1992) 
performances, wherein the gallery was transformed into a cafeteria of sorts 
serving the Southeast Asian dish pad thai (Artnet), achieving its form from the 
resultant inter-human relations established in this transaction. Bourriaud observes 
the benefit of a work such as this – the sharing of time and the sharing of food in a 
seemingly utopian models of sociability – is so as to enter the gallery-goer into a 
dialogue wherein they possess the individual agency to themselves effect the form 
of the work.  
Bishop describes Relational Aesthetics as an attempt to invert the goals of 
Greenbergian Modernism by dictating that meaning is collectively produced, whilst 
standing in opposition to the ‘discrete’ and ‘private’ space of a supposedly closed 
artwork (2005: 54). Relational Aesthetics, Bishop supposes, does not prescribe to 
the models of optical contemplation that a traditional relationship between viewer 
and artwork dictates, but rather pertains to a relationship in which a public is 
provided with a stake in the production of the work. This, Bishop connotes, is due 
to the form of the work of art as being a ‘social form’ and thus capable of 
producing positive human relationships, an assertion she underpins in Bourriaud’s 
belief that art not merely reflect culture but produce it.  
However, Bishop denies the utopian usefulness of these forms as described by 
Bourriaud, as she questions the truly emancipatory nature of the art institutions in 
which these works typically sit, or as I would describe as the ritual environment 
that the gallery space encompasses. Bishop places this in one instance with the 
literal interaction that is demanded by ‘relational’ works, which she contests by 
considering that all artworks are potentially ‘open’ in their having an infinite 
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number of readings, it is simply the achievement of Relational Aesthetics to 
contextualise work which foregrounds this fact (Bishop, 2005: 62). In addition to 
this, Bishop also considers the problematisation of both the physical context of 
many of these works, and also the audience for which they are typically designed. 
Speaking of Tiravanija, Bishop states that the work relies upon its position within a 
gallery and its participation from gallery-goers to differentiate it from 
entertainment, as well as claiming that the structure of the work circumscribes the 
outcome in advance (2005: 68-69). The result is one in which the microtopia there 
created is one that is designed only for the few who identify as gallery-goers. I 
would argue this demonstrates, building upon Von Hantelmann’s speculation, that 
the specific set of social rituals inherent within art institutions are seemingly hard 
to escape, and so too here can the liberal concerns for autonomy and 
individualism be seen to be demonstrated – even in an apparently socially 
democratised art form.  
It is not the goal, nor is it within the scope, of this study to present a case one way 
or the other as to the efficacy or longevity of Relational Aesthetics. Nor is it the 
intention of this study to stake claims for any individual benefits to be found in the 
art institution’s different environments, wherein individualistic and arguably elitist 
concerns are realised and enacted. However, considering this study’s focus upon 
the social form that objects take – fetishism -  a consideration within my own 
immediate art historical context as to the discourse surrounding the social form of 
art is necessary. What I would consider, as Bishop did, is the position of the optical 
contemplation of objects as also being capable of producing social forms that 
Relational Aesthetics somewhat negates, and moreover the social activity of 
encounter that objects themselves are invested in. A social encounter with objects 
and the symbolic relations arising therefrom sits at the centre of the ritual of the 
art institution, and furthermore in our wider social worlds as has been outlined in 
my considerations of commodity fetishism and animism. What this study aims to 
demonstrate is the agency implicit in the material practices of fetishism as a 
means of describing its capacities to itself produce social relations.  
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Chapter 3 
SEEING IS BELIEVING 
As has so far been described, fetishism identifies an ascription of value to objects 
arising not from their concrete material qualities, but rather from a set of 
collectively imagined social relations as informed by their symbolic value. So too 
does fetishism describe a means by which meaning is collectively negotiated 
through social rituals and thusly projected onto objects, seemingly animating them 
in the process. There is a perception then that the agency of the fetish, as was 
described from the outset, describes an ascription of value or power that is 
somehow misplaced, with those who believe in their efficacy having left 
themselves invested in the illusions they create. My final chapter will subsequently 
consider the agency implicit in the creation of such illusions, and moreover how 
the irreality of the fetish only cements its power. Baudrillard considers that 
fetishism – which was historically used as a term to imply some supernatural 
power or entity embodied within an object and a viewpoint that is bound up with 
notions of a primitive form of ‘magical thinking’ -  fetishism should actually be 
defined in terms of the opposite; that is a fabrication, an artefact or a labour of 
appearances and signs (Baudrillard, 1995: 91). Where then lies the power in 
fabrication, in artifice or in the investment of belief in these seemingly non-real 
things?  
Each of the artworks I have produced throughout this study have utilised similar 
notions of artifice and the investment of belief that artifice demands. Be that in the 
illusion of death as a cardboard cut-out that I employed in my production of We 
Scorn What We Eat (Fig. 1), the invitation to perceive a commodity object as 
human in my scene depicting the Martyrdom of St Sebastian (Fig. 4, 6), or in the 
false narratives of tragedy that I created as a means of sacralising public spaces 
in Symbolic Retribution (Figs. 2, 3). Each of these decisions were made with the 
intent of illustrating the scant regard for the real that fetishism supposes.  
It is at this juncture I will introduce an additional and final artwork titled Sky Fetish 
– The Demiurgic Instinct (Figs. 8, 9). The work stands at three metres tall, and is 
composed of a steel frame and ladder which leads up towards a computer 
generated 3d rendering of the sky, digitally printed onto aluminium. There are  
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Fig. 8 – Sky Fetish – The Demiurgic Instinct (2019) 
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notable references to which this piece owes its composition, the most immediate 
of which will be that of Jacob’s Ladder – a biblical story of the old testament in 
which Jacob was presented by God an image of heaven with a stairway leading 
towards it (Genesis 28:12). There are though more wider inferences of symbolism 
of the sky as representing a place that is forever unattainable, and subsequently 
as a place where the gods live. Eliade discuses the potency of such imagery in his 
text The Sacred and the Profane, wherein he states that “simple contemplation of 
the celestial vault already provokes a religious experience. The sky shows itself to 
be infinite, transcendent.” (Eliade, 1959: 118) Eliade expands upon these 
considerations as he expresses the prevalence of such imagery across diverse 
historical, geographical and religious contexts in what he terms as sacred pillars, a 
totemic symbol that connects the heavens and the earth, brings them into 
communion with one another as well as provide a fixed point of absolute reality 
around which the cosmos is brought into order (Ibid: 34). Jacob’s ladder could 
indeed be thought of in these same terms, and one can begin to understand the 
potency with which the sky – or rather a desire to come into contact with it – is 
perceived. It was this universal potency that led me to employ this symbolism as a 
means of understanding its encompassing of a desire to reach the unattainable. 
The sky furthermore demonstrates the means by which belief and subsequently 
meaning – in this instance of the sky and its heavenly inhabitants – is socially 
ascribed. It was these considerations that led me to produce a copy of the sky, as 
a means to understand the benefit of producing illusions that are ascribed with 
potent value or sacred power.  
 
3.1 - The Copy 
Taussig rigorously addresses the artifice created by objects and their mimetic 
function, and there is particular importance in the perspective he provides to 
representational images and their use in such rites, which provides useful insight 
into the agency of copying (1993). These observations are made in relation to the 
logic of sympathetic magic and its practices as theorized by James George Frazer, 
this magic understood to exist on the two levels of copy and contact, the latter of 
which I have previously discussed (pp. 29-30). Taussig describes the copy,  
40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9 – Sky Fetish – The Demiurgic Instinct (2019) 
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within these magical practices, as affecting the real original to such a degree that 
the representation shares in or acquires the properties of the represented 
(Taussig, 1993: 47-48), which is to infer that the representation and the 
represented become one and the same thing. The conclusion to this logic is the 
principle that to harm the copy is to harm the subject, or as Frazer explains “[…]just 
as the image suffers, so does the man, and that when it perishes he must 
die.”(Ibid: 48) Taussig explains how such is the extent of the agency of 
representations, that ritual acts of violence are committed against such objects in 
order to afflict the subject – such as driving arrows or nails into small wooden 
figurines depicting an enemy. These ideas not only provide insight into the ritual 
logic of effigy making, but also into the agency implicit in the fetishized character 
of such objects - the very act of representation causing them to be attributed with 
human traits and abilities to such a degree that they are capable of transmitting 
affliction to the person they represent.  
A worrying precedent is here set for the power of the copy to affect the original, 
particularly when one considers not only the proliferation of objects but also the 
proliferation of images – that is of copies - that informs the contemporary visual 
landscape as well as the capitalist models of exchange and value. Taussig 
considers that the era of industrialised reproduction produced a resurgence of 
mimicry, a conclusion he achieves by considering the work of Walter Benjamin 
(Ibid: 19-20), which is easy to understand when one considers the advent of the 
production line and the resultant proliferation of objects made valuable not only by 
their difference, but also by their equivalence. Taussig also considers this in 
relation to the mimetic function of the photographic image, which also provides 
useful insight into our contemporary relationship with images, and moreover their 
efficacy as tools of duplication and reproduction. At what point, then, does the 
copy acquire an agency that is independent of the original? Furthermore, by what 
processes then might the copy be capable of affecting the original?  
Taussig offers further insight into these questions by providing an example of 
Antisemitism and the role of mimesis in its formulation, whilst considering the 
writings of Theodor Adorno (Ibid: 66). Taussig equates that it is the goal of the 
anti-Semite to produce a replica of their own mental image of a Jew, and then 
duplicate these images in order to proliferate them. What these processes of 
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replication and mimesis demonstrate is the capacity for the copy to affect the 
value of the original, and certainly also their ability to afflict harm on them. Imagery 
and its uses in such a way is familiar within our own contemporary visual culture, 
in which relentlessly duplicated imagery of individuals is evident in our culture of 
celebrity, and even in our own individual desire to duplicate our own image on 
social media. But here too, much like Taussig’s equation of the reproduced image 
in the mind of the anti-Semite, it is the degree to which these images are 
manipulated and steeped with a socially ascribed symbolic value, that the 
representational image becomes entangled with the individual represented, and is 
thus capable of affecting them. It is also evident the means by which these 
images, through their manipulation, reside in the imaginary. It could then be 
understood that the act of representation - be that in producing images of gods, 
individuals or supernatural forces – mimesis acts as a tool of control. 
These considerations were also reiterated by Sonia Silva in her article Reification & 
Fetishism – Processes of Transformation, in which she describes similarly 
afflicting uses of Fetishism and Reification (Silva, S. 2013). Silva discusses the 
portrayal of Tutsis as ‘cockroaches’ by the Hutus prior to the Rwandan genocide, 
the depiction of ‘Fallen Women’ in 20th Century Ireland who were sent to 
Magdalene Asylums, or even the colloquial use of the term ‘Nerd’ as used in High 
Schools across the world. Arguably one could consider that these examples, too, 
provide evidence of the affliction capable in the mimetic reproduction of an image 
of a group or individual, and also how these duplicated images come to affect the 
original. 
 
3.2 - Concretizing God 
“In some way or another one can protect oneself from evil spirits by portraying 
them." (Taussig, 1993: 1) 
It is with these considerations in mind then that the fetishistic principle of mimesis 
can be understood in terms of its capacity to exert control over the individual that 
it represents, and furthermore a means by which unstable forces are capable of 
being brought under control. Taussig draws wider comparisons over the uses of 
mimesis as a tool of manipulation, not limited merely to the power of representing 
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ones earthly enemies, but also in the agency of mimicking spirits, supernatural 
forces, colonial settlers and animals, to name a few (1993). These considerations 
also provide useful insight into the production and use of religious deities, in the 
prevalent belief that by crafting an image of a god, one is capable of coming into 
contact with them and subsequently bringing them under control.  
The power of mimesis in this regard played heavily in my intention to employ a 
fabricated image of the sky in such a way, in my piece Sky fetish – The Demiurgic 
Instinct (Figs. 8, 9). Building upon my previous considerations of the potency of the 
sky’s universally symbolic value, and its position as representing the unattainable 
abode of the gods, it was intended that by producing such a representation that it 
would mimic or acquire the same power of the religious icon, as I identified the sky 
as connoting some universal notion of sacrality. Of course, what is here being 
mimicked is not merely visual, but moreover symbolic. To these ends, I am not 
intending to produce a copy of what the sky is, but rather what the sky means as a 
social ascription of symbolic value that transforms it into a divine being.  
“But what becomes of the divinity when it reveals itself in icons, when it is 
multiplied in simulacra? Does it remain the supreme authority, simply incarnated in 
images as a visible theology? Or is it volatilized into simulacra which alone deploy 
their pomp and power of fascination – the visible machinery of icons being 
substituted for the pure and intelligible Idea of God?” (Baudrillard, 1983: 8) 
Of course, if the mere act of copying gods and rendering them as objects or 
images is sufficient to acquire their power or bring them under control, what does 
that say about the authority of divine powers? Moreover, what insight does this 
provide for the power implied in producing copies, and images? Similar questions 
are above quoted by Baudrillard in his canonical text Simulations. These 
considerations are made through his conception of what he termed the precession 
of simulacra – simulacra describing something which simulates the real. 
Baudrillard makes a distinct separation between something that is simulated and 
something that is simply fake, stating that a simulation somehow possesses the 
same capacities of the thing it represents (Ibid: 5). These properties are of course 
evident in religious icons, in which there is a distinctly blurred boundary between 
the representation and the represented, to such an extent that these images 
become capable of much the same veneration as well as the same sacred 
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abilities. There are notable similarities with Baudrillard’s conceptions of simulacra 
and the mimetic object as described by Taussig, and furthermore with my own 
considerations of fetishism and animation describing a capacity of things to 
possess a value which is inflated. The precession of simulacra then, for 
Baudrillard, describes a condition in which simulacra could be seen to be 
preceding the real, whilst being privileged above the real and created in the 
absence of any original reference. Simulacra’s precession connotes a condition in 
which the real has somehow been abandoned in favour of the non-real, the 
precedent here set being one in which the replication of the non-real proliferates 
as it becomes wholly self-referential. In this instance, the real and the non-real 
become indistinguishable from one-another - a condition described by Baudrillard 
as hyperreality (Ibid). Such is the extent of the agency of the seemingly illusory 
capacities of simulation, that Baudrillard states that it threatens the very 
difference between "true" and "false" and between "real" and "imaginary" (Ibid: 3). 
These considerations informed my decision to produce an image of the sky as a 
computer generated 3d rendering in my piece Sky Fetish – The Demiurgic Instinct 
(Figs. 8, 9). The intention of this was to produce an image that presented a 
convincing illusion of the natural world, and one that could at first glance maintain 
its Illusion or conceal its artificiality. Of course, the caveat to this illusion is that 
once the artifice of the image has been revealed, it is in essence no different to the 
photograph it is at first assumed to have been, as a photograph too depends upon 
its mimetic capacities to produce both copy and illusion of the real. Taking these 
considerations even further, Benjamin posits as previously mentioned that even 
the act of looking only merely produces a copy on the retina (Taussig, 1993: 20). 
Where then do these concepts leave the very notion of the real itself, with its 
concrete and material qualities? The assertion here being made with this piece is 
that the real sky, the photograph of the sky and the computer generated image of 
the sky each produce the same effects and possess the same symbolic 
capacities, when considered in relation to either fetishism or simulacra, thus 
demonstrating the negation of the real that such a perspective suppose. The 
purpose of this is to demonstrate the means by which both copy and original can 
become interchangeable, and the agency this supposes for producing 
representational objects.  
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These considerations are furthermore reflected in the title of the piece, the 
‘Demiurgic’ instinct here referring to the figure of the Demiurge as described in the 
school of thought commonly categorised as Gnosticism2. The character of the 
Demiurge is synonymous with the ‘God the Creator’ as described in the biblical 
book of Genesis, and is translatable from the Latin as describing an artisan or 
craftsman, which conjures an image of God creating the world as if rendering an 
image in clay (Hoeller, 2002). However, the figure of the Demiurge is characterised 
as an imperfect God who thusly produced the material world in an imperfect 
manner. I wished to employ this as a metaphor with which to describe the artistic 
impetus to produce images of the material world in much the same way, and 
furthermore the ‘god-like’ agency implicit in this. In so doing I am demonstrating a 
privileging of the copy over the so-called original, whilst asserting that through an 
employment of both mimesis and fetishism, a digitally produced sky is 
interchangeable with the real one. This also serves to illustrate a collapsing of the 
differences between what is real and what is imaginary, as described by 
Baudrillard (1983: 3).  
 
3.3 - Escape Strategies 
“The symbolic is neither a concept, an agency, a category, nor a ‘structure’, but an 
act of exchange and a social relation which puts an end to the real, which resolves 
the real, and, at the same time, puts an end to the opposition between the real and 
the imaginary.” (Baudrillard and Gane, 1993: 133) 
Baudrillard considers the opposition that exists between the real and the 
imaginary in much the same way as he considered the opposition that exists 
between the living and the dead, as discussed in my first chapter (pp. 5-13). This is 
to say that they are co-dependent so as to provide legitimacy to one another; the 
real establishing its value only in terms of its difference from its opposite, the 
imaginary. I would consider that the imaginary then presents a threshold which 
exists beyond the boundaries of material existence, and one that as described 
above by Baudrillard, is circulated within the social ascription of symbolic 
 
2 Gnosticism is a somewhat disputed term, due to its encompassing of a vast swathe of early 
Christian philosophies deemed to be ‘heretical’, with little overarching orthodoxy (Gardner, 2010). 
However, it is a useful term in this context so as to locate the historical context of the figure of the 
Demiurge to which this study is alluding. 
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exchange. A desire then to engage with the symbolic and enter into the imaginary 
could be viewed as a desire to escape one’s material reality. The imaginary in the 
context of this study describes the illusion that fetishized objects produce, and 
also the symbolic ascriptions of value that powers their illusion, as has been 
rigorously addressed throughout the entirety of this study. The fetishized object 
then finds itself existing in a schism between opposites; in one instance material, 
and in the other immaterial, in one instance real, whilst in the other imaginary and 
in one instance present, whilst in the other absent. The fetish could then be seen 
to act as a mediator or a signpost, directing the viewer to engage with something 
that exists outside of the object, or even beyond materiality itself – be that either 
sacred or social forces. 
The promise of escape that fetishes suppose, and furthermore their position as 
mediatory tools, played heavily in my creation of Sky Fetish – The Demiurgic 
Instinct (Figs. 8, 9), wherein quite a literal albeit futile escape route is being 
presented to the viewer by way of a ladder. The image of a stairway to heaven 
presents quite a literal visualisation of a boundary being crossed between one 
world and another, with the promise of escape being presented also as a promise 
of salvation. The ladder as an object with both symbolic and utilitarian values 
presents an invitation for the viewer to climb it, however this invitation is one that 
they are unable or at least unlikely to heed, not least because the ladder was not 
designed to be climbed but also due to the specific social behaviours required by 
the art institution in which it sits. The ladder then is not a ladder but an image of a 
ladder, much like the sky is not a sky but an image of the sky, so any invitation for 
the viewer to climb is one that can only be accepted in an imaginary scenario with 
symbolic terms. What is here being iterated is not just the unattainability of 
heaven, but moreover the intangibility of the imaginary. By inviting the viewer to 
climb the ladder only as a conscious effort – a conscious effort which they 
perform collectively both with other gallery-goers, and also within the social 
ascriptions of symbolic exchange – I am privileging the power the imaginary holds 
over the real.  
Taussig considers that our engagement with objects encapsulates our desire to 
merge with our surroundings, or to somehow experience existence beyond 
ourselves (1993). This, Taussig equates, demonstrates the human desire to seek 
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out and engage with alterity, or otherness – that which exists in opposition to us. 
The otherness to which Taussig alludes could easily be compared also with the 
imaginary, and furthermore our desire to engage with that which exists beyond 
what is considered to be concrete and real. The fetishized object then presents an 
opportunity for us to travel beyond ourselves, beyond materiality and beyond the 
real, as it stands at the threshold between us and other.  
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CONCLUSION 
To conclude, this study has demonstrated the means by which fetishism can be 
used to define our understanding of objects as anything but static, but rather as 
animated, agential and powerful things. The power of the fetishized object has 
been shown to exist at the moment of encounter, serving not to define only the 
nature of the objects themselves but moreover our relationship with them. It is 
within this relationship, and furthermore the means by which we work upon 
objects with our minds, implicate them with value, and the social agency that 
informs this transaction, that they cease being dead and are animated. This power 
of animation is one which elevates the fetish beyond its objecthood, beyond its 
material confines and beyond its passivity and towards a condition in which it is 
an autonomous entity capable of agency.  
The agency of the fetish has also revealed the effect such objects have on 
individuals, and furthermore the wider implications of our relationship with the 
material world. This relationship is one which has been shown to be mutually 
entangled and invested, wherein our relationships with objects come to define our 
sense of self, our sense of others and our sense of the wider world. It is in so 
doing that the fetish has been demonstrated as an inherently social object, its 
power maintained and existing as a social relation as informed by both belief and 
its symbolic value.  
Each of these considerations demonstrate the benefit an understanding of the 
fetish quality of objects can have on artistic practice, through the means by which I 
have explored, through the production of artworks, an encounter between people 
and objects, the form that this encounter takes and how a utilization of this 
encounter causes artworks to be imbued with agency. This study has also 
demonstrated an academic understanding of the position fetishized objects hold 
within our wider cultural, social and personal imaginations, as well as the 
emotional investments such objects are charged with, which has been reflected in 
both the subject matter and form that these artworks have adopted. These 
considerations demonstrate how an understanding of the fetishistic quality of 
objects can be employed in art practice, as a means of understanding and 
producing the agency they are capable of.  
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